Abortion: Judicial and Legislative Control by Lewis, Karen J. et al.
ABORTION: JU3ICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
ISSUE BRIEF NUMEER IB74019 
AUTHOR: 
Lewis, Karen J. 
American Law Division 
Rosenberg, Morton 
American Law Division 
Porter, Allison I. 
American Law Division 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM 
DATE ORIGINATED 
DATE UPDATED 





In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, and that a State may not unduly burden the exercise of that 
fundamental right by regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access 
to the means of effectuating that decision, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. But 
rather than settling the issue, the Court's rwlings have kindled heated 
debate and precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, 
State and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or hinder their 
effectuation. These governmental regalations have, in turn, spawned further 
litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no 
more successful in dampening the controversy. Thus the 97th Congress 
promises to again be a forum for proposed legislation and constitutional 
amendments aimed at limiting or prohibiting the practice of abortion and 1981 
will see Court dockets, including that of the Supreme Court, filled with an 
ample share of challenges to5State and local actions. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The background section of this issue brief is organized under five 
categories, as follows: 
I. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
A. Development and Status of the Law Prior to 1973 
B. The Supreme Court's 1973 Abortion Rulings 
11. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO "ROE" AND "DOE" 
A .  Informed Consent, Spousal Consent, Parental Consent, and 
Reporting Requirements 
B. Parental Notice 
C. Advertising of Abortion Services 
D. Abortions by Non-Physicians 
E. Abortions in Public and Private Hospitals 
F. The Definition of Viability 
111. THE PUBLIC FUNDING OF ABORTIONS 
A. The 1977 Trilogy -- Restrictions on Public Funding of 
Nontherapeutic or Elective Abortions 
B. The Public Funding of Therapeutic of Medically Necessary 
Abortions -- The Supreme Court's Decisions in McRae 
and Zbaraz 
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES RELATING TO ABORTION 
V. LEGISLATION 
A. Constitutional Amendments 
B. Human Life Statute 
C. Hyde-Type Amendments to Appropriations Bills 
D. Hyde-Type Amendments to Substantive Bills 
E. Limitation on Federal Court Jurisdiction 
F. Early Developments in the 97th Congress 
G. Public Laws 
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I. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
A. Development and Status of the Law Prior to 1973 
The moral and legal issues raised by the practice of abortion has tested 
the philosophers, theologians, and statesmen of every age since the dawn of 
civilization. The Stoics' belief that abortion should be allowed up to the 
moment of birth was vigorously opposed by the Pythogoreans who believed that 
the soul was infused into the body at conception and that to abort a fetus 
would be to commit murder. Early Roman law was silent as to abortion; and 
abortion and infanticide was common in Rome, especially among the uppper 
classes. Opposition by scholars and the growing influence.of the Christian 
religion brought about the first prohibition of abortion during the reign of 
Severus (193-211 A.D.). These laws made abortion a high criminal offense and 
subjected a woman who violated the provisions to banishment. During the 
European Middle Ages major church theologians differentiated between an 
embryo informatus (prior to endowment of a soul) and an embryo formatus 
(after endowment with a soul). The distinction was used to assess 
punishments for abortion, fines being levied if abortion occurred before 
animation but death ordered if it was aborted at any time after. 
The English common law adopted the doctrine of "quickening" i-e., the 
first movement of the fetus in the mother's womb, to pinpoint the time when 
abortion could incur sanctions. Generally, at common law, abortion performed 
before quickening was not an indictable offense. There is dispute whether 
abortion of a quick fetus was a felony. The predominant view is that 
abortion of a quick fetus was, at most, a minor offense. In the United 
States, the law in all but a few States until the mid-19th Century adopted 
the pre-existing English common law. Thus, no indictment would occur for 
aborting a fetus for a Consenting female prior to quickening. However, there 
could be an indictment afterward. Also, as was the case under the common 
law, a woman herself was not indictable for submitting to an abortion, or for 
aborting herself, before quickening. 
By the time of the Civil War, however, an influential antiabortion 
movement began to affect legislation by inducing States to add to or revise 
t.heir statutes in order to prohibit abortion at all stages of gestation. By 
1910 every State had antiabortion laws, except Kentucky whose courts 
judicially declared abortions to illegal. In 1967, 49 of the States and the 
District of Columbia classified the crime of abortion as a felony. The 
concept of quickening was no longer used to determine criminal liability but 
was retained in some States to set punishment. Non-therapeutic abortions 
were essentially unlawful. The States varied in their exceptions for 
therapeutic abortions. Forty-two States permitted abortions only if 
necessary to save the life of the mother. Other States allowed abortion to 
save a woman from "serious and permanent bodily injuryw or her "life and 
health." Three States allowed abortions that were not "unlawfully performed" 
or that were not "without lawful justification", leaving interpretation of 
those standards to the courts. 
This, however, represented the highwater mark in restrictive abortion law? 
in the United States, for 1967 saw the first victory of an abortion reform 
movement with the passage of liberalizing legislation in Colorado. The 
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legislation was based upon the Model Penal Code. The movement started in the 
early 1550s and centered its efforts on a proposed criminal abortion statute 
developed by the American Law Institure that wculd allow abortions when 
childbirth posed grave danger to the physical or mental health of a woman, 
when there was high likelihood of fetal abnormality, or when pregnancy 
resulted from rate or incest. 
Between 1967 and the Supreme Court's 1973 decisions in Roc and Doe, 
approximately one-third of the States had adopted, either in whole or in 
part, the Model Penal Code's provisions allowing abortions in instances other 
than where only the mother's life was in danger. Also, by the end of 1970, 
four States (Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington) had repealed criminal 
penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy by a licensed physician, 
subject to stated procedural and health requirements. 
The first U.S. Supreme Court decision dealing with abortion was rendered 
in 1971. U.S. v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62. In Vuitch, the' Court denied a 
vagueness challenge to the District of Columbia abortion statute. The net 
effect of the Vuitch decision was to expand the availability of abortions 
under the D.C. law's provision allowing abortions where "necessary for the 
preservation of the mother's ... health." 
B. The Supreme Court's 1973 Abortion Rulings 
Eetween 1968 and 1972 the constitutionability of restrict~ve abortion 
statutes of many States were challenged on the grounds of vagueness, 
violation of the fundamental right cf privacy, and denial of equal protection 
under these laws. These challenges met wlth mixed success in the lower 
Courts. However, on Jan. 22, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its rulings in 
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. In those cases the Court found that Texas and 
Georgia statutes regulating abortion interfered to an unconstitutional extent 
with a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The Texas 
statute forbade all abortions not necessary "for the purpose of saving the 
of the mother." The Georgia enactment permitted abortions when 
continued pregnancy seriously threatened the woman's life or health, when the 
fetus was very likely to have severe birth defects, or when the pregnancy 
resulted from rape. The Georgia statute required, however, that abortions be 
performed only at accredited hospitals and only after approval by a hospital 
committee and two consulting physicians. 
The Court's decisions were delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun for himself 
anC six other Justices. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. The Court 
ruled that States may not categorically proscribe aaortions by making their 
performance a crime, and that States may not make abortions unnecessarily 
difficult to obtain by prescribing elaborate procedural guidelines. The 
constitutional basis for the decisions rested upon the conclusion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment right of personal privacy embraced a woman's decision 
whether to carry a pregnancy to term. The Court noted that its prior 
decisions had "found at least the roots of ... a guarantee of personal 
privacy" in various amendments to the Constitution or their penumbras (i.e., 
protected offshoots) and characterized the right to privacy as grounded in 
"the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
State action." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152, 153 (1973). Reg'arding the 
scope of that right, the Court stated that it included "only persgnal rights 
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
libertynv and "bears some extension to activities related to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationship, and child rearing and 
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education." Id. at 152-153. Such a right, the Court concluded, "is brcad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy." Id. at 153. 
With respect to protection of the right against State interference, the 
Court held that since the right of personal privacy is a fundamental right, 
only a "compelling State interest" could justify its limitation by a State, 
Thus while it recognized the legitimacy of the State interest in protecting 
maternal health and the preservation of the fetus' potential life, Id. at 
148-150, and the existence of a rational connection between these two 
interests and the State's antiabortion law, the Court held these interests 
insufficient to justify an absolute ban on abortions. Instead, the Court 
emphasized the durational nature of pregnancy and held the State's interests 
to be sufficiently compelling to permit curtailment or prohibition of 
abortion only during specified stages of pregnancy. The High Court concluded 
that until the end of the first trimester an abortion is no more dangerous to 
maternal health than childbirth itself, and found that: 
W ith respect to the State's important and legitimate 
interest in the health of the mother, the "compellingw point, 
in light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately 
the end of the first trimester. Id. at 163. 
Only after the first trimester does the State's interest in protecting 
maternal health provide a sufficient basis to justify State regulation of 
akortion, and then only to protect this interest. Id. at 163-164. 
The "compellingq1 point with respect to the State's interest in the 
potential life of the fetus "is at viability." FoLlowing viability, the 
State's interest permits it to regulate and even proscribe an abortion except 
when necessary, in appropriate medical $udgment, for the preservation of the 
life or health of the mother. =Id. at 163-164. The Court defined viability 
as the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the 
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." - Id. at 160. The Court 
summarized its holding as follows: 
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of 
the first trimester of pregnancy , the abortion decision 
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment 
of the pregnant woman's attending physician. 
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end 
of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its 
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, 
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State 
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human 
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother. 
410 U.S. at 164-165 
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court reiterated its holding in 
Roe v. Wade that the basic decision of when an abortion is prcper rests with 
the pregnant mother and her physician, but extended - Roe by warning that just 
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as States may not prevent abortion by making the performance a crime, States 
m3.y not make abortions unreasonably difficult to obtain by prescribing 
Elaborate procedural barriers. In E, therefore, the Court struck down 
State requirements that abortions be performed in licensed hospitals; that 
abortions be approved beforehand by a hospital committee; and that two 
physicians concur in the abortion decision. - Id. at 196-199. The Court 
appeared to note, however, that this would not apply to a statute that 
protected the religious or moral beliefs of denominational hospitals and 
their employees. Id. at 197-98. 
The Court in Roe also dealt with the question whether a fetus is a person 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution. The 
Court indicated that the Constitution never specifically defines "person," 
but added that in nearly all the sections where the word person appears, 
"...the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally. 
None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal 
application." 410 U.S. at 157. The Court emphasized that given the fact 
that in the major part of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion 
practices were far freer than today, the Court was persuaded "that the word 
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." 
~ d .  at 158. 
The Court did not, however, resolve the question of when life actually 
begins. While noting the divergence of thinking on this issue, it, instead, 
articulated the legal concept of "viability," which is defined as the point 
at which the fetus is potentially able to live outside the womb, although the 
fetus may require artificial aid. Id. at 160. 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton did not 
address a number of important abortion-related issues which have subsequently 
been raised.by State actions seeking to restrict the scope of the Court's 
rulings. These include the issues of informed Consent, spcusal COnS2nt, 
parental consent, and reporting requirements. In addition, Roe and Doe never 
resolved the question of what, if any, type of abortion procedures may be 
required or prohibited by statute. Moreover, there remained the matter of 
whether fetal protection statutes were constitutional. Unanswered by the 
1973 cases as well was the constitutionality of three oth2r types of statutes 
affecting access to abortion: (1) those proscribing the advertising regarding 
the availability of an abortion or abortion-related services in another 
State; (2) those prohibiting abortions by non-physicians; and (3) those 
allowing private hospitals to refuse to perform abortions. In addition, 
since Roe and Doe, questions have arisen with respect to the 
constitutionality of: (1) the experimental use of fetuses; (2) waiting period 
requirements; (3) termination of parental rights; (4) the right of a 
physician to refuse to participate in an abortion; and (5) notice 
requirements. Finally, the entire matter of the Government funding of 
abortions was not dealt with in Roe and Doe, since public funding was not 
possible at that time. 
11. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO "ROE" AND "DOE" 
A. Informed Consent, Spousal Consent, Parental Conseat, and Reporting 
Requirements 
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (19761, the Court held that 
informed consent statutes, which require a doctor to obtain the written 
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con.sent of a woman after informing her of the dangers of abortion ar,d 
possible alternatives, are constitutional if the requirements are related ts 
maternal 3ealth and are not overbearing. 428 U.S. 52, 65-66. The fact that 
the informed consent laws mast define their requirements very narrowly in 
order to be constitutional was later confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1979 
when it summarily affirmed an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
holding to that effect in Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 
1978) aff'd mem., 99 S.Ct. 1416 (1979). The requirements of an informed 
consent statute must also be narrDwly drawn so as not to unduly interfere 
with the physician-patient relationship, although the type of information 
required to be given to a woman of necessity may vary according to the 
trimester of her pregnancy. 
In addition to informed consent, the Danforth decision dealt with the 
issue of spousal consent. The Supreme Court found that spousal consent 
statutes, which require a written statement by the father of the fetus 
affirming his consent to the abortion, are unconstitutional if the statutes 
allow the husband to unilaterally prohibit the abortion in the first 
trimester. 428 U.S. 52, 69. It should be noted that on the same day that 
the Supreme Court decided Danforth, it also summarily affirmed the lower 
court decision in Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 
428 U.So 901 (1976), which held unsonstitutional a spousal consent law 
regardless of the stage of the woman's pregnancy. 
With respect to parental Consent statutes, the Supreme Court held in 
Danfcrth that those statutes that allow a parent or guardian to absolutely 
prohibit an abortion to be perforined on a minor child were unconstitutional. 
Subsequently, in Belotti v. Baird, 443. U.S. 622 (1979), the Court ruled that 
while a State may require a minor to obtain parental consent, the State must 
also provide an alternative procedure to procure authorization if parental 
consent is denied or the minor does not Want to seek it. From the reasoning 
used in Belotti, it appears that the Court felt a minor is entitled to some 
proceeding which allows her to prove her ability to make an informed decision 
independent of her parents, or that even if she is incapable of making the 
decision, at least showing that the abortion wocld be in her best interests. 
The Court in Danforth also ruled that reporting requirements in statutes 
requiring doctors and health facilities to provide information to States 
regarding each abortion performed, are Con~tit~tional. The Court specified, 
however, that these reporting requirements relate to maternal health, remain 
confidential, and may not be overaearing. 428 U.S. 52, 80-81. 
Another aspect in the Danforth case related to the constitutionality of 
abortion procedure statutes that prohibit the use of saline amniocentesis to 
obtain an abortion. The Court held such statutes unconstitutional because it 
believed that a procedure as widely accepted in medical circles as that 
requiring the use of saline amniocentesis could not be prohibited. Moreover, 
the State statute in question was held to be inconsistent in its 
proscription, since it allowed other more dangerous procedures while 
prohibiting some that were safer, more effective, and rriore widely accepted by 
the medical profession. 
Finally, another significant ruling made by the Court in Danforth was that 
fetal protection statutes were generally overbroad and unconstitutional if 
they pertained to pre-viable fetuses. Such statutes require a doctor 
performing an abortion to use available means and medical skills to save the 
life of the fetus. In a subsequent decision, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379 (1979), the Supreme Court held that such fetal protection statutes could 
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only apply to viable fetuses and that the statute must be precise in setting 
forth the standard for determining viability. In addition, the Court in 
Colautti stressed that in order to meet the constitutional test of sufficient 
certainty, fetal protection laws had to define whether a doctor's paramount 
duty was to the patient or whether the physician had to balance the possible 
danger to the patient against the increased odds of fetal survival. 439 U.S. 
S 379, 397-401. 
B. Parental Notice 
The Supreme Court did attempt to provide further clarification of the 
parental consent and notification issues in its decision in Bellotti 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). There the Court held unconstitutional a 
Massachusetts statute that required parental consultation or notification in 
every instance without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive 
an independent judicial determination that she was mature enough to consent 
or that the abortion would be in her best interests. The Court also found 
unconstitutional a statutory provision that permitted judicial authorization 
for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by the court to be 
mature and fully conpetent to make the decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy independently. However, in an effort to provide some futura 
guidelines, the court, in dicta, suggested that if a State wished to use 
parental notification, it must afford the minor the option of proceeding 
directly to court, without parental notification, where she must show that 
she is a mature minor or that, if she is found not able to make the decision 
independently, the desired abortion is in her best interests. Four of the 
eight justices objected to this suggestion on the ground that it was an 
advisory opinion. 
On Mar. 23, 1981, the Court upheld a Utah State law making it a crime for 
doctors to perform an abortion on an unemancipated, dependent minor without 
notifying her parents. in H.L. v. Matheson, 79-5903, a 6-to-3 decision, the 
Court examined the narrow question of the facial COnStitUti~nality of a 
statute requiring a physician to give notice to parents, "if possible," prior 
to performing an abortion on their minor daughter, (a) when the girl is 
living with and dependent upon her parents, (b) when she is not emancipated 
by marriage or otherwise, and (c) when she has made no claim or showing as to 
her maturity or as to her relationship with her parents. The Supreme Court 
cited the interest in preserving family integrity and protecting adolescents 
in allowing States to require that parents be informed that their daughter is 
seeking an abortion, and emphasized that the statUte in question did not give 
a veto power over the minor's abortion decision. Chief Justice Burger 
reasoned that the Utah law, "as applied to immature and dependent minors ... 
serves the important considerations of family integrity and protecting 
 adolescent^.^ In addition, parental notice provides "... an opportunity for 
parents to supply essential medical and other important information to a 
physician. The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an 
abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particulary so when the 
patient is immature." The Court rejected the minor woman's contention that 
abortion was being singled out for special treatment in Contrast to other 
surgical procedures, like childbirth, which do not require parental notice. 
The Chief Justice responded that the situations differed and "if the pregnant 
girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical decisions to be made 
entail few -- perhaps none -- of the potentially grave emotional and 
psychological consequences of the decision ro abort." Thus, the Court found 
the Utah law to be constitutional, since if served important State interests, 
was narrowly drawn to prot-ect only those interests, and did not in any way 
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violate any of the guarantees of the Constitution. Still directly 
unanswered, however, is the question whether parental notification can b g  
required in the case of a mature, emancipated minor. The implication of the 
Bellotti and Eatheson rulings is that such a law would be constitutionally 
suspect. 
C. Advertisement of Abortion Services 
The Supreme Court held in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), that a 
State may not proscribe advertising regarding the availability of an abortion 
or abortion-related services in another State. The court found that the 
statute in question was unconstitutional because the State of Virginia, where 
the advertisement appeared, had only a minimal interest in the health and 
medical practices of New York, the State in which the legal abortion services 
were located. 
D. Abortions by Non-Physicians 
In Connecticut v. Menillo, 429 U.S. 9 (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that 
State statutes similar to the Texas law challenged in Roe were constitutional 
to the extent that the statutes forbid non-physicians from performing 
abortions. The Roe decision made it clear that a State could not interfere 
with a woman's decision, made in consultation with and upon the advice of her 
doctor, to have an abortion in the first trimester of h.er pregnancy. The 
Menillo Court found that ?re-= restrictive abortion laws were still 
enforceable against non-physicians. 423 U.S. 9, 11. 
E. Abortions in Public and Private Hospitals 
In Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court 
held that the policy of the City of St. Louis in refusing to allow the 
performance of nontherapeutic abortions in its public hospitals, and of 
staffing those hospitals with personnel opposed to the performance of 
abortions, did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 
Poelker, however, did not deal with the question of private hospitals and 
their authority to prohibit abortion services. In Poelksr, the Court dealt 
with the right of a municipality to elect to provide publicly financed 
hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for 
non-therapeutic abortions. The Court approved this practice. 
No cases have been reported challenging State laws which allow doctors to 
refuse to participate in abortion procedures. This may be explained by the 
fact that a woman can always seek out another physician who could perform an 
abortion, should a doctor initially refuse because of religious or other 
beliefs. 
To date the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision regarding the 
COnStitUtiOnality of State statutes that allow private hospitals to refuse to 
participate in abortions; however, Federal district Courts have ruled on this 
issue. See, e.g., Jones v. Eastern Me. Med. Center, 448 F. Supp. 1156 (D. 
Me. 1978), where the court upheld such a law. 
F, The Definition of Viability 
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The Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of viability has required 
further elaboration, particularly with regard to the critical question of who 
defines at what point a fetus has reached viability. 1n ~ o e  the court 
defined viability as the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to 
live outside the mother's Womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 
160. Such potentiality, however, must be for "meaningful life" and this 
cannot encompass simply momentary survival. 410 U.S. at 163. The Court also 
noted that while viability is usually placed at about 28 weeks, it can occur 
earlier and essentially left the point flexible for anticipateii advances in 
medical skill. Finally, Roe stressed the central role of the pregnant 
woman's doctor, emphasizing that "the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision." 410 U.S. at 160. Similar 
themes were stressed in =Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth=, 
428 U.S. 52 (1976), in which a Missouri law, which defined viability as "that 
Stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued 
indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems", 
was attacked as an attempt to advance the point of viability to an earlier 
stage of gestation. The Court disagreed, finding the statutory definition 
consistent with Roe. It re-emphasized that viability is matter of medical 
judgment, skill, and technical ability" and that Roe meant to preserve the 
flexibility of the term. 428 U.S. at 64. Moreover, the Danforth Court held 
that "it is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place 
viability, which is esentially a medical concept, at a specific point in the 
gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each 
pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, 
and must be, a matter for the judgment of the attending physician." 428 U.S. 
at 64. The physician's central role in determining viability, and the lack 
of such definitional authority in the legislatures and courts, was most 
recently reaffirmed by the Court in Colautti Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 
(1979). 
111. THE PUSLIC FUNDING OF ABORTIONS 
Two categories of public funding cases have been heard and decided by the 
Supreme Court: (1) those involving funding restrictions for nontherapeutic 
(elective) abortions and (2) those involving funding limitations for 
therapeutic (medically necessary) abortions. 
A. The 1977 Trilogy -- Restrictions on Pablic Funding of Nontherapeutic or 
Elective Abortions 
On June 20, 1977, the Supreme Court, in three related decisions, ruled on 
the question whether the Medicaid statute or the COnStitUtiOiI requires public 
funding of nontherapeutic (elective) abortions for indigent women or access 
to public facilities for the performance of such abortions. The Court held 
that the States have neither a statutory nor a C O n ~ t i t ~ t i ~ n a l  obligation in 
this regard. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977) ; and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) . 
In Beal v. Doe, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act required the funding of nontherapeutic 
abortion as a condition of partieipation in the Medicaid program established 
by the Act. The Court heid that nothing in the language or legislative 
history of Title XIX requires a participating State to fund every medical 
procedure falling within the delineated categories of medical care. Each 
State is given broad discretion to deternine the extent of medical assistance 
that is "reasonablev1 and "consistent with the obligations'' of Title XIX. The 
Court ruled that it was not inconsistent with the Act's goals to refuse to 
fund unnecessary medical services. The Court recognized the State's interest 
in encouraging normal childbirth and found no congressional intent to 
undercut that interest by subsidizing the costs of nontherapeutic abortions. 
However, the Court did indicate that Title XIX left a State free to include 
coverage for nontherapeutic abortions should it choose to do so. 
In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court resolved a constitutionaP challenge ts 
Connecticut's refusal to reimburse Medicaid recipients for abortion expenses 
except where the attending physician certifies the abortion to have been 
medically or psychiatrically necessary. The Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require a State participating in the Medicaid 
program to pay expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions simply because 
the State has made a policy choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth. 
More particularly, C0nx?ecticutts policy of favoring childbirth over abortion 
was held not to i'mpinge upon the funds.menta1 right of privacy recognized in 
Roe v. Wade, which protects a woman from undue interference in her decision 
to terminate a pregnancy. According tc the Court, the State's choice did not 
handicap an indigent woman desiring an abortion, since she could continue, as 
before, to look to private abortion services and private sources of funding. 
In essence, the Court found no absolute bar for an indigent woman seeking an 
aSortion. 
In Poelker v. Doe, the Court upheld a regulation of the municipalities of 
St. Louis that denied indigent pregnant women nontherapeutic abortions at 
public hospitals. In an unsigned per curiam opinion, the Court stated that 
it held "for the reasons stated in Maher, that the Constitution does not 
forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a 
preference for normal childbirth as St. Louis has done." 432 U.S. at 521. 
B. The Public Funding of Therapeutic or Medically Necessary Abortions -- The 
Supreme Court's Decisions in McRae and Zbaraz 
The 1977 Supreme Court decisions left open the question whether Federal 
law, such as the Hyde Amendment, or similar State laws, could validly 
prohibit governmental funding of therapeutic abortions. 
On June 30, 1980, in a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Hyde Amendment's abortion funding restrictions were constitutional. The 
Court's majority found that the Hyde Amendment neither violated the due 
process or equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment nor the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court also upheld the right 
of a State participating in the Medicaid program to fund only those medically 
necessary abortions for which it received Federal reimbursement. Harris 
McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980). In companion cases raising similar issues, 
the Court held that a State of Illinois statutory funding restriction 
comparable to the Federal Hyde Amendment also did not contravene the 
constitutional restrictions of the equal protection clause of the ,-Fsu-eenth 
Amendment,. Williams v. Zbaraz; Miller v. Zbaraz; U.S. v. Zbaraz, LO0 <.F<. ,-- __- ._ 
2694 (1980),. The Court's rulings in McRae and Zbaraz mean there is no 
statutory or constitutional obligation on the States or the Federal 
Government to fund all medically necessary abortions. 
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES RELATING TO ABORTION 
Among the abortion issues not yet addressed by the Supreme Court are the 
constitutionality of State statutes regarding: (1) the experimental use of 
fetuses; (2) waiting period requirements; (3) termination of parental rights; 
and (4) the right to refuse to provide abortion services by physicians and/or 
private hospitals. 
The subject of the experimental use of fetuses was challenged in Wynn v, 
Scott, 449 F.Supp. 1302 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 8 (1979). In 
Wynn, the district court upheld as constitutional a State law that prohibited 
live nonviable or certain dead viable fetuses from being used for 
experimental purposes. 449 F-Supp. at 1322. The Court further found that 
the provisions in the law being challenged did "not impose any burden on the 
woman who is deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy." - Id. Moreover, 
the Court in Wynn ruled that the parties challenging the statute's validity 
failed to prove that a rational relationship did not exist between the 
provision in tho law and the State's interest in regulating the practice of 
medicine. 
The question of the constitutional validity of State laws restricting 
fetal research is likely to recur. To date, there are approximately 19 
States with laws that attempt to limit fetal research. Thus, other court 
challenges may be anticipated. 
Another issue relating to abortion that has yet to reach resolution in the 
Supreme Court is that involving State laws requiring women to wait between 24 
and 72 hours prior to receiving their abortions. Most of the cases have held 
that such waiting period requirements which apply to all women were 
constitutional. Wolfe v. Schroerinp, 541 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Wynn 
Scott, 449 F-Supp. i302 (N.D. Ill. 1978). One court found that a waiting 
period which applied only to minors was unconstitutional. Wynn v. Carey, 599 
F. 26 193 (7th Cir. 1979). The court reasoned that the statute in question 
was invalid because it was underinclusive by excluding married minors, and 
overinclusive by including mature, emancipated minors. More recently, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ordered the State of 
Massachusetts to suspend a requirement that women wait 24 hours after signing 
a mandatory consent form before an abortion can be performed, pending a lower 
court ruling on the merits. The court held that although the delay was 
"extremely brief," it constituted a "substantial State-created burden on a 
Woman's fundamsntal right" to have an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. - 
Bellotti, 80-1580, 1st Cir., Feb. 19, 1981. 
A number of States have laws that automatically terminate parental rights 
if a live infant results from an attempted abortion. These laws have 
uniformly been held unconstitutional. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F. 2d 193 (7th Cir. 
1979); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. 111. 1978). These courts 
have generally reasoned that such statutes are invalid because the provisions 
threaten women with a cut-off of parental rights without according them 
procedural due process. There are two States, Indiana and Minnesota, that 
have provisions for voluntary termination of parental rights which have not 
been challenged to date. 
A final area in dispute involves the question of the constitutional 
validity of State laws that allow doctors and/or private hospitals to refuse 
to participate in an abortion. No cases have been reported challenging State 
statutes allowing physicians to refuse to perform an abortion. There have 
been challenges to State laws allowing private hospitals to refuse to 
participate in abortions. Such statutes have generally withstood court 
challenges. In one case a Federal court invalidated the provision because it 
found that the private hospital in question was sufficiently intermingled 
with the Government to constitute State action. The presence of State action 
caused the court to rule that the private hospital had to admit patients for 
abortions. Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. 529 F. 2d 638 (4th Cir. 
1975). See also, Jones v. Eastern Me. Med. Center, 448 F.Supp. 1156 (D-Me. 
1978). 
Public hospitals, however, do not have to allow abortions in certain 
circumstances. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), where the Supreme 
Court held that the City of St. Louis had the fight to refuse to provide 
publicly financed hospital services for nontherapeutic abertions. 
V .  LEGISLATION 
In the 96th Congress, ? 3  bills were introduced containing some type of 
restrictive abortion provision. Thus far in the 97th Congress, 42 bills have 
been submitted. The proposals may be divided into five general categories: 
A. Bills that seek a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion; 
B. Bills that seek to prohibit abortion by statute; 
C. Hyde-type amendments to aFpropriations bills; 
D. Hyde-type amendments to substantive bills; and 
E. Bills that limit Federal court jurisdiction over abortion-related 
issues. 
An examination of the biils in each of the five categories helps clarify 
the different issues and methods proposed to restrict the availability of 
abortion. 
A. Constituticnal Amendments 
Since 1973, constitutional amendments have been introduced in Congress in 
an attempt to overrule the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. These 
constitutional amendments have fallen into two areas: The "State's rightsw 
or State option type of amendment and the so-called "right to lifew or "human 
life amendment (HLA)" proposal. The "State's rights" amendment would result 
in abortion standards that would vary from State to State. Some States night 
prohibit abortions entirely; other could have no restrictions at all. In 
effect, such an amendment would restore to the States the same control over 
abortion rights that existed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe 
Wade in 1973. This option is not as popular as it once was. No "State's 
rights" amendments have been introduced in the 96th Congress. However, 
S.J.Res. 110, a "Human Life Federalism Amendment," was introduced Sept. 21, 
1981, by Senator Hatch. This proposed constitutional amendment is not like 
the typical "State's rights" amendment previously submitted. S.J.Res. 110 
provides: " A  right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The 
Congress and the several States have the concurrent power to restrict and 
prohibit abortions: Provided, that a law of a State which is more 
restrictive than a law of Congress shall govern." Hearings on S.J.Res. 110 
are to be held by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution Oct. 
5, 14, 19; Nov. 5, 6 ,  12, 16. 
The typical "right to life" amendment would create a new right in the 
unborn (personhood) which the Supreme Court has declared is not guaranteed in 
the Constitution at present. Presently, the Fifth anC Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit only the Federal and State governments from depriving anyone of life 
without due process of law. Some provisions of proposed "right to life" 
amendments would extend the prohibition to include private individuals as 
well. The proposed amendments utilize a variety of terms to define the time 
the right attaches: "conception," "moment of fertilization" or "at any stage 
of biological development." 
Some amendments introduced allow abortion to save the life of the mother. 
Some provide no exceptions. 
In the 97th Congress, the following proposed constitutional amendments 
have been introduced: H.J.Res* 13, H.J.Res. 27, H.J.Res. 32, H.J.Res. 39, 
H.J,Res. 50, H.J.Res. 62, H.J.Res. 92, H.J.Res. 99, H.J.Res. 104, H.J.Res. 
106, H.J.Res. 122.- H.J.Res. 125, H.J.Res. 127, H.J.Res. 133, H.J.Res. 198, 
H.J.Res. 249, H.R. 392, S.J.Res. 17, S.J.Res. 18, S.J.Res. 19, and S.J.Res. 
110. 
The only hearings held prior to the 97th Congress were conducted 
periodically from 1974 to 1976 without any recommendation being made. In 
this Congress, hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers on Apr. 23 and 24, May 20, 21, June 1 ,  10, 12, and 18, 
1981, to discuss S. 158 and the policy implications of a Human Life Statute. 
Hearings are presently being held on S.J.Res. 110. 
B. Bills that Seek to Prohibit Abortion by Statute 
As an apparent alternative to the thusfar unsuccessful efforts to achieve 
congressional passage of a constitutional amendment to prohibit or limit the 
practice of abortion, opponents of abortion have introduced several bills in 
the 97th Congress which they anticipate will accomplish the same objective 
without resorting to the complex process of amending the Constitution. 
Authority for such an action is said to emanate from section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers the Congress to enforce the due process 
and equal protection guarantees of the amendment "by appropriate 
legislation." The proposed legislation, S. 158, H.R. 900 and H.R. 3225, 
would declare as a congressional finding of fact that human life begins at 
conception and would, it is contended by its sponsors, allow States to enact 
laws protecting human life, including fetuses. The bills would make it more 
difficult to test the constitutionality of State laws prohibiting abortions 
by withdrawing jurisdiction of the lower Federal courts to review these State 
laws. An appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from the decision of a State's 
highest Court would still be allowed, in some instances on an expedited 
basis. 
Hearings on S. 158 were held in May and June 1981 before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers. The hearings were marked 
by controversy among the witnesses and the members of the subcommittee over 
the constitutionality of the declaration that human life begins at 
conception, which contradicts the Supreme Court's specific holding in Roe 
Wade, and the withdrawal of lower Federal court jurisdiction over suits 
challenging State laws enacted pursuant to the Federal legislation. On July 
9 ,  1981, the subcommittee by a vote of 3-2 approved a modified version of S. 
158. It was agreed, however, that full Judiciary Committee consideration of 
the so-called Human Life Statute would be delayed until the Subcommittee on 
the Constitution completes hearings on proposed constitutional amendments on 
the subject. The subcommittee is not expected to complete its work until 
sometime in 1982. 
C. Hyde-Type Amendments to Appropriations Bills 
Congress has attached abortion restrictions to appropriations bills, the 
first being the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, P.L. 93-189. However, more 
recently the focus of attention has been on restricting the availability of 
abortions under the Medicaid program. The latter series of restrictions have 
popularly become known as the Hyde Amendments. To date, there have been four 
enactments of this limitation on Federal funding of abortions under the 
annual Departments of Labor (DOL) and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
appropriations bills. 
The first version of the Hyde Amendment was enacted as a rider to the FY77 
Labor/HEW Appropriation Act, P.L. 94-439. Section 209 of the law provided 
that, 
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to 
perform abortions except where the life of the mother 
would be endangered in the fetus were carried to term. 
During the first session of the 95th Congress, another restrictive 
provision was attached to ,the FY78 Labor/HEW Appropriations Act. This 
measure, P.L. 95-205, provided in part that: 
None of the funds prcvided for in this paragraph shall be 
used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or 
except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims 
of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported 
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health 
service; or except in those instances where severe and 
long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would 
result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so 
deternined by two physicians. 
Nor are payments prohibited for drugs or devices to 
prevent implantation of the fertilized ovum, or for medical 
procedures necessary for the termination of an ectopic 
pregnancy. 
This provision thus broadened the use of appropriated funds to. include 
medical procedures for promptly reported cases of rape and incest, long 
lasting physical health damage to the mother, and other matters. 
The Labor/HEW abortion policy for FY79 is found in Section 210 of P.L. 
95-480. This third enactment of the Hyde Amendment was essentially the same 
as that of FY78. 
For FY80, the Labor/HEw abortion policy was changed by enactment of the 
fourth version of the Hyde Amendment, which excluded abortions "where severe 
and long lasting physical health damage would result if the pregnancy were 
carried to term," but retained the other provisions enacted for FY78 and 
FP79. See P.L. 96-123, Section 109. 
The House and Senate were unable to reach agreement on final FY81 funding 
contained in the Labor/HHs appropriations measure. After a protracted 
debate, a contincing resoiution was adopted that contains a Hyde Amendment 
which differs from the most recent restrictions in two resFects. First, a 
rape must be reported to a law enforcement agency or public health service 
within 72 hours. Second, and most significant, the States were released from 
the obligation to fund any abortion if they so choose. Prior to this 
provision the courts had interpreted the Medicaid statute to require the 
States to fund all abortions allowed under the Hyde Amendment. See P.L. 
96-536. The continuing resolution expired on June 6, 1981, and was replaced 
by P.L. 97-12 (H.R. 3512). P.L. 97-12 provided for public funds for abortion 
Only to save the life of the mother. There are no rape or incest exceptions. 
It also gave States the option not to fund abortions. P.L. 97-12 expired on 
Sept. 3C, 1981, and has been succeeded by P.L. 97-51 (H.J.Res. 325), another 
continuing resolution for FY82, which was signed by President Reagan on Oct. 
1, 1981. The provisions of P.L. 97-12 were reenacted and will be effective 
until Nov. 20, 1961. 
Restrictions on the Federal funding of abortion has had a significant 
impact on the number of abortions performed under the Medicaid StatUte. 
Prior to the enactment of the Hyde Amendment, the Office of Population 
Affairs, DiiEW, prepared very rough estimates of Federal funds expended for 
aSortions under the Medicaid program. The Office of Population Affairs 
estimated tnat in 1974 Medicaid financed between 220,000 and 278,000 
abortions at a cost of $40-50 million. For 1976, the Office estimated that 
Medicaid financed abortion procedures at an annual rate of 250,000 to 300,000 
at a cost of $45-55 million. According to the Medicaid data branch of the 
Office of Policy, Planning and Research, DHEW, from Feb. 14, 1978 through 
Dec. 31, 1978, 2,328 abortions were funded at a cost of $777,158 to State and 
Federal governments. 
The Hyde Amendment process has not been limited to the annual Labor/HHS 
appropriations bill. During the 95th and 96th Congresses, Hyde-type abortion 
limitations were enacted into law as Section 863 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 1979 (See P.L. 95-457, 95th Congress, 2d session 
(1978)) and as amendments to the District of Columbia appropriation bill for 
FY80. (See P.L. 96-93, 96th Congress, 1st session, (1979).) 
Section 863 of the 1979 Department of Defense Appropriation Act is 
referred to as the Dornan Amendment. It uses language identical to that of 
FY78 and ~ ~ 7 9  Labor/~EW appropriations. The Dornan Amendment restricts the 
use of military appropriations for abortions, and the restrictions 
specifically apply to military personnel and their dependents. 
The abortion restriction for Federal funds provided to the District of 
Columbia (D.C.) stated: 
None of the Federal funds provided in this Act shall be 
used to perform abortions except where the life of the inother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or 
except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims 
of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported 
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service. 
Nor are payments prohibited for drugs or devices to prevent 
implantation of the fertilized ovum, or for medical procedures 
necessary for the termination of an ectopic pregnancy. 
This limitation does not appear to restrict the use of non-Federal funds at 
the disposal of the District of Columbia. The same funding restriction was 
continued in the District's FY81 appropriation. P.L. 96-530, Section 118. 
On July 30, 1981, the House passed the Ashbrook amendment (roll call no. 
182, 253-161) to H.R. 4121, the Treasury-Postal Service Appropriations Act 
for PY82. The amendment prohibits the use of funds, except where the life of 
the mother is endangered, to pay for an abortion or the administrative 
expenses connected with any health plan under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits program that covers abortions. The bill has been sent to the Senate 
for further action. 
D. Hyde-Type Amendments to Substantive Bills 
Since 1973 several authorization bills have been adopted by Congress that 
directly relate to the abortion issue. The Health Services Extension Act of 
1973, P.L. 93-45, Contained a conscience clause, a provision that prohibits 
complying institutions and individuals that receive FeCeral funds to perform 
or participate in abortion or sterilization procedures from discriminating 
against applicants because of their beliefs on abortion. The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1973, P.L. 93-189, prohibited the use of funds to pay for 
the performance of abortions or to coerce any person to practice abortion. 
No conscience clause bills have been introduced in the 97th Congress. 
In the recently approved Onnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.E. 
97-35 (H.R. 3982), the Public Health Services Act was amended by adding a new 
title XX entitled "Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects," which 
prchibits the funding of programs if they provide abortions or abortion 
related services as follows: 
"Sec. 2011. (a) Grants or payments may be made only to programs or 
projects which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or referral, 
or which do not subcontract with or make any payment to any person who 
provides abortions or abortion counseling or referral, except that any such 
program or project may provide referral for abortion counseling to a pregnant 
adolescent if such adolescent and the parents or guardians of such adolescent 
request such referral; and grants may be made only to projects or programs 
which do not advocate, promote, or encourage abortion. 
"(b) The Secretary shall ascertain whether programs or projects 
comply with subsection (a) and take appropriate action if programs or 
projects do not comply with such subsection, including withholding of funds". 
In the current Congress, H.R. 3480, the Legal Services Corporation Act 
Amendments of 1980, passed the House on June 18, 1981, with a provision to 
prohibit legal assistance with respect to abortion unless the abortion is 
necessary to save the life of the mother. An amendment (offered by 
Representative Sensenbrenner) was rejected 160-242. It would have prohibited 
giving legal advice concerning a client's rights and r.esponsi5ilities 
regarding abortion. The bill is now awaiting Senate action. 
H.R. 1059 and H.R. 1060 of the 97th Ccngress would permit the parent or 
guardian of a minor child to inspect personal medical files of the minor 
except for that portion of the file that relates to family planning services 
!~ncluding abortion) sought and received by such minor. Neither bill has 
come out of committee. 
In the 96th Congress, a different approach was proposed in several bills 
known as the Family Protection Act. The bills required federally-funded 
abortiox and venereal disease treatment centers to notify parents of 
unmarried minors that such minors have requested an abortion, contraceptives, 
or are undergoing treatment for a venereal disease. A similar proposal, H.R. 
311, was introduced in this Congress. Two other bills, also entitled Family 
Protection Acts, have a slightly different emphasis. These bills, H.R. 3955 
and S. 1378, require the notification of parents or guardians before a 
federally funded program, project, or entity may provide contraceptive or 
abortion services tc.an unmarried minor. The bills would also amend the 
Legal Services Corporation Act to prohibit legal assistance for any 
proceeding or litigation to compel an abortion or State or Federal funding 
for an abortion. 
The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, S. 
1196, would prohibit using population planning and health program funds to 
pay for research related to the issue of abortions or involuntary 
sterilization as a means of family planning. 
H.R. 2446 of the 97th Congress would amend Title X of the Public Health 
Service Act to deny grants and contracts to any entity that provides abortion 
counseling to minors without the knowledge and consent of their parents or 
guardians. H.R. 2447 does not limit the restriction to Title X facilities. 
E. Limitation on Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Several bills have been introduced in the 9?th Congress proposing 
limitations on the power of Federal courts, H.R. 73, H.R. 900, H.R. 3225, S. 
158, and S. 583 would prohibit Federal courts (excluding the Supreme Court) 
from issuing injunctive relief in any case dealing with abortion. H.R. 867 
would remove the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Federal district 
courts to prohibit the consideration of any abortion case. 
Hearings have been held in both Houses on whether Congress has the 
authority to remove the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or lower Federal 
courts over abortion cases. Other controversial issues such as school 
busing, school prayer, and the military draft have also precipitated 
congressional attempts to curb Federal court jurisdiction. The hearings thus 
far have not concentrated on a particular issue, but rather have focused on 
Congress' power over the courts generally. However, S. 583, H.R. 73, and 
H.R. 867 were among the bills examined. Hearings were held by the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution on May 20-21, and June 22, 1981. 
The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
Administration of Justice held a hearing on June 3, 1981. 
F. Early Developments in the 97th Congress 
The 97th Congress has demonstrated an intense interest in the abortion 
issue with respect to overturning Roe v. Wade. Several sets of hearings have 
been held on the proposed Human Life Statute, on the authority of Congress to 
remove jurisdiction from the Federal courts, and the Human Life Federation 
Amendment. 
P.L. 97-12 has further restricted MeCicaid funding for abortions by 
dropping rape and incest exceptions and permitting the public funding of 
abortions only to sav2 the life of the mother. 
H.R. 3480 prohibits the Legal Services Corporation from providing legal 
assistance with respect to abortion unless the abortion is necessary to save 
the life of the mother. 
With the exceptions of the proposed Human Life Statute and the Human Life 
Federalism Amendment, the joint resolutions calling for a constitutional 
amendment that have been introduced do not differ significantly from those 
introduced in previous Congresses. By October 1981, 21 proposed right to 
life constitutional amendments were introduced. Seven would provide no 
specific exception for procedures to save the life of the mother: H.J. Res. 
13, H.Y.Res. 32, H.J.Res. 50, H.J.Res. 104, H.J.Res. 106, H.R. 392, S.J.Res, 
19. Twelve would make the amendment inapplicable to laws permitting medical 
procedures required to save the life of the mother: H.J.Res. 27, H.J.Res. 39, 
H.J.Res. 62, H.J.Res. 92, H.J.Res. 99, H.J. Res. 122, H.J.Res. 125, H.J.Res, 
127, H.J.Res. 133, H.J.Res. 249, S.J.Res. 17, S.J. Res. 18. In a different 
twist, H.J,Res. 198 permits an abortion to save the life of the mother, but 
requires that reasonable efforts be made to perserve the life of the person 
who is the subject of the abortion. Only one State's rights constitutional 
amendment has been introduced, S.J.Res. 110. Six bills have been introduced 
to curtail Federal court jurisdiction. One measure (H.R. 867) would 
eliminate all Federal court jurisdiction, including the Supreme Court, to 
review any case arising out of State law or action relating to abortion. 
Others prohibit any Federal court except the Supreme Court from issuing an 
injunction in any case arising out of a federal, State or local law that 
prohibits or regulates abortion or the provision of public assistance for the 
performance of abortions. 
Finally, in a novel approach, three bills, H.R. 900, S. 158 and H.R. 3225, 
have been introduced that would define the term person to include the unborn 
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amandment. These Right to Life Statutes 
therefore seek to overrule the contrary holding of Roe v. Wade by legislation 
rather than constitutional amendment on the basis that such legislation is 
authorized under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prcvides that 
"the Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article." See section V.B. above. 
G. Public Laws 
93rd Congress 
Five public laws governing abortion were enacted during the 93rd Congress: 
(1) P.L. 93-45, the Health Service Extension Act of 1973, approved June 18, 
1973; (2) P.L. 93-96, the National Science Foundation Authorization Act for 
FY74, approved Aug. 16, 1973; (3) P.L. 93-189, the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1973, approved Dec. 17, 1973; (4) P.L. 93-348, the ~iomedical Research Act of 
1974, approved July 12, 1974; and (5) P.L. 93-355, the Legal Services 
Corporation Act of 1974, approved July 25, 1974. 
94th Congress 
Two public laws were enacted during the 94th Congress: (1) P.L. 94-63, 
the Nurses Training Act of 1975, approved July 29, 1975; and (2) P.L. 94-439, 
the Labor-HEW Appropriations Act for FY77, approved Sept. 30, 1976. 
95th Congress 
During the 95th Congress, eight measures containing abortion restrictions 
were signed into law: (1) P.L. 95-205, the Continuing Appropriations for 
FY78, approved Dec. 9, 1977; (2) P.L. 95-215, the Health Services Act 
Amendments of 1977, approved Dec. 19, 1977; (3) P.L. 95-424, the 
Internatiocal Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, approved Oct. 6@ 
1978; (4) P.L. 95-444, the Civil Rights Commission Act, approved Oct. 13, 
1978; (5) P.L. 95-457, the Defense Department Applopriations Act for FY79, 
approved Oct. 3.3, 1978; (6) P.L. 95-480, the Labor-HEW Appropriations Act for 
FY79, approved Oct. 18, 1978; (7) P.L. 95-481, Foreign Assistance 
Appropriations Act, approved Oct. 18, 1978; and (8) P.L. 95-555, the 
Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978, approved Oct. 31, 1978. 
96th Congress 
In the 96th Congress, nine public laws contained abortion restrictions: 
(1) P.L. 96-76, the Nurse Training Act Amendments of 1979, approved Sept. 29, 
1979; (2) P.L. 96-86, the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY80, approved 
Oct. 12, 1979; (3) P.L. 96-93, the District of Columbia Appropriations Act 
for FY80, approved Oct. 30, 1979; (4) P.L. 96-123, the Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act for FY80, approved Nov. 20, 1979; (5) P.L. 96-154, the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY80, approved Dec. 21, 1979; 
(6) P.L. 96-306, the Supplemental Appropriations and Recission Act of 1980, 
approved July 8, 1980; (7) P.L. 96-369, the Continuing Appropriations Act for 
FY81, approved Oct. 1, 1980; (8) P.L. 96-580, the District of Columbia 
Appropriations Act for FY81, approved Dec. 13, 1981; (9) P.L. 96-536, the 
Continuing Appropriations Act for FY81, approved Dec. 16, 1981. 
97th Congress 
Thus far, three measures containing restrictions on abortion have been 
enacted: P.L. 97-12 (H.R. 3512), the Supplemental Appropriations and 
Recission Act of 1981, provides that none of the funds in the Act shall be 
used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be 
endangered if the fetus were carried to term. The States are free not to 
fund abortions to the extent that they in their sole discretion deem 
appropriate. P.L. 97-35, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 
amends the Public Health Services Act by adding a new title XX, entitled 
"Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects," which prohibits the funding 
of programs if they provide abortions or abortion related services. P.L. 
97-51 (H.J.Res. 325), a continuing funding resolution, extends the abortion 
restrictions through Nov. 20, 1981. 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 73 (Ashbrook et al.) , H.R. 867 (Crane, P.)/S. 583 (Hatch) 
Both H.R. 73 and S. 583 prohibit lower Federal courts from issuing 
injunctive relief in any case dealing with abortion, but allow Supreme Court 
jurisdiction. H.R. 867 removes the jurisdiction of ali Federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to review abortion cases. Hearings held on H.R. 
73 and H.R. 967 by House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration of Justice June 3, 1981. Hearings held on S. 583 by 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution May 20-21, June 22, 1981. 
H.R. 900 (Hyde et al.) , H.R. 3225 (Mazzoli et al.) /S. 158 (Helms et al.) 
Defines "person" to include the unborn for the purpose of the right to 
life guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prohibits any inferior 
Federal court from issuing injunctive relief in any case arising out of State 
or local law that prohibits or regulates abortion or the provisions of public 
assistance for the performance of abortions. H.R. 900 introduced Jan. 19, 
1981; H.R. 3225 introduced Apr. 10, 1981; referred to Committee on the 
Judiciary. S. 158 introduced Jan. 19, 1981; referred to Committee on the 
Judiciary; hearings held by Subcommittee on Separation of Powers Apr. 23-24, 
May 20-21, June 1, 10, 12, 18, 1981; amended bill reported to full committee 
July 9 ,  1981. 
H.R. 3480 (Rodino et a1 . )  
Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1980. As passed by House, 
prohibits legal assistance with respect to abortion unless the abortion is 
necessary to save the life of the mother. The Sensenbrenner amendment, 
rejected by House 160-242, sought to prohibit the giving of legal advice 
concerning a client's rights and responsibilities regarding abortion. 
Introduced May 7, 1981; referred to Committee on the Judiciary; passed House 
June 18, 1981; awaits Senate action. 
H.R. 4121 (Roybal) 
Treasury, Postal Service Appropriations Act for FY82. As passed by the 
House, prohibits the use of funds, except where the life of the mother is 
endangered, to pay for an abortion or the administrative expenses connected 
With any health plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits program that 
covers abortions. Introduced Jan. 15, 1981; referred to Committee on 
Appropriations; passed House July 30, 1981; reported by Senate Committee on 
Appropriations Sept. 18, 1981. 
S. J. Res. 110 (Hatch) 
Provides that there be no right to abortion under the Constitution and 
gives Congress and the States concurrent power to restrict and prohibit 
abortions with more restricting State laws given preference. Hearings to be 
held by the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution Oct. 5, 14, 19; 
Nov. 5, 6, 12, 16, 1981. 
HEARINGS 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights. Proposed constitutional 
amendments on abortion. Hearings, 94th Congress, 2d session. 
Feb. 4, 5; Mar. 22-27, 1976. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice. Constitutional restraints 
upon the judiciary. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st 
session, on H.R. 73 and H.R. 867. June 3, 1981. (not 
yet published) 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments. Abortion. Hearings, 93d Congress, 2d 
session, on S.J.Res. 119 and S.J.Res. 130. Part 1. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 729 p. 
Hearings held Mar. 6 and 7, Apr. 10, 1975. 
----- Abortion. Hearings, 93d Congress, 2d session, on S.J. Res. 
119 and S.J. Res. 130. Part 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1975. 
Hearings held Apr. 25, May 7, June 4 and 26, July 24, Aug. 21, 
Sept. 12, and Oct. 8, 1974. 
----- Abortion. Hearings, 936 Congress, 2d session, on S.J.Res. 119 
and S.J.Res. 130. Part 3. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1975. 475 p. LRS75-22721 
----- Abortion. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session, on S.J.Res. 6, 
S.d.Res. 10 and 11, and S.J.Res. 91. Part 4. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 1001 p. 
Hearings held Mar. 10, Apr. 11, May 9, June 19, and July 8, 1975. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 
Subcommittee an the Constitution. Constitutional 
restraints upon the judiciary. Hearings, 97th Congress, 
1st session, on S. 583. May 20-21, and June 22, 1981. 
(not yet published) 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Proposed human 
life statute. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session, on 
S. 158. Apr. 23-24, May 20-21, June I, 10, 12, 18, 1981. 
(not Yet published) 
CHRGNOLOGY OF EVENTS 
08/13/81 -- P.L. 97-35 signed by President Reagan. Amends the 
Public Health Service Act by adding a new title XX, 
entitled "Adolescent Family Life Demonstration 
Projects,'' which prohibits the funding of PHs 
programs if they provide abortions or abortion 
related services. 
06/05/81 -- P.L. 97-12 signed by President Reagan. Allows 
Federal Medicaid funds for abortions only to save 
the life of the mother. 
03/23/81 -- The Supreme Court upheld a Utah statute that required 
a physician to give notice to parents before performing 
an abortion upon an unemancipated, dependent minor. 
03/17/80 -- Supreme Court refused to reconsider a June 30 decision 
upholding Congressional restrictions on the use of Medicaid 
funds to pay for abortions. 
06/30/80 -- The U.S. supreme court rules that the Hyde Amendment 
abortion restrictions are constitutionally valid. 
01/16/80 -- The annual abortion restriction to Labor/HEW appropriation 
bills was held unconstitutional by a U.S. district Court 
in Brooklyn, N.Y. (KcRae v. Secretary, HEW). 
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